Nyaya Philosophy: Logic and Reasoning

Nyaya Philosophy: The System of Logic and Reasoning

The Sage Gotama or Gautama

The sage Gotama or Gautama is the founder of the Nyāya system. He is also known as Akşapāda. Nyāya means argumentation. So the system is called the science of reasoning (Tarkaśāstra). It is predominantly epistemological – intellectual, analytical and logical. So it is also variously called as the science of logic or epistemology (Pramānaśāstra), the science of causes (Hetuvidya), science of debate (Vādavidya) or the science of critical study (Anvikşiki). Gautama’s Nyāya-sutra is the main source of this school. Vātsayana’s Nyāya-bhāsya, Udayotkara’s Nyāya-vārtika and Vāchaspati’s Tatparya-tika are the other important sources of this school. Udayana’s Nyāya-kusumanjali and Jayanta’s Nyāya-manjari are also the important works of this system. Nyāya is allied to the Vaiśeşika system. The former develops logic and epistemology whereas the latter develops metaphysics or ontology. One deals with the right knowledge of reality and the other takes up the exposition of reality. Nyāya adopts mostly the Vaiśeşika metaphysics. So it is called the system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism. Both the systems view the earthly life as full of suffering and they regard liberation as the absolute cessation of suffering. Both agree that bondage is due to ignorance of reality and liberation consists in the right knowledge of reality. However, there are some important points of difference between the two schools. Firstly, the Vaiśeşika recognizes only seven categories whereas Nyāya accepts sixteen categories and includes all the seven of the former in the category called Prameya or the knowable. Secondly, the Vaiśeşika admits of only two Pramanas, namely, perception and inference, whereas the Nyāya accepts the four Pramanas, namely, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

2. Epistemology

According to the Nyāya, Knowledge (Jňāna) is the same as cognition (Buddhi). It is also known as apprehension (Upalabdi), consciousness or experience (Anubhava). Knowledge is that which reveals both the subject and the object. It is also revelation or manifestation of objects (Arthaprakaşa). Just as a lamp reveals objects placed before it, so knowledge reveals objects which come before it. Nyāya says that knowledge may be valid or invalid. Right apprehension of an object is valid knowledge. Knowledge, in order to be valid, must correspond with reality (Paratahpramānya). So, valid knowledge is the manifestation of the object as it is. Invalid knowledge is that which fails to manifest its object as it is. It is of four kinds, viz., memory (Smŗiti), doubt (Samśāya), error (Viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (Tarka). Memory is not valid because it is representative and not presentative cognition. The object remembered is not directly presented to the soul but only indirectly recalled. Doubt is not valid because it is uncertain cognition. Error involves misapprehension of an object and does not correspond to the real object. And the hypothetical reasoning is not valid knowledge because it involves supposition devoid of certainty as in the case of the argument ‘If there were no fire, there cannot be smoke’.

3. Perception (Pratyakşa)

According to the Nyāya, there are four kinds of valid knowledge produced by four valid means, namely, perception, inference, comparison (analogy) and verbal testimony. Perception is the cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. It is the direct or immediate cognition which is not derived by means of any other cognition. It involves the contact of the self with the manas, the manas with the sense-organs, and the sense-organs with the objects. There are two stages in the process of perception, namely, indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa). Indeterminate perception is that which is not associated with a name (avyapadeśya). It is the immediate apprehension, the bare awareness and the direct sense-experience of the object. It is free from assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis. It is the consciousness of the ‘that’ which is not yet determined by the consciousness of the ‘what’. The determinate perception (savikalpa) is the cognition of the object clearly with its name and attributes. It is seeing a rope as rope, cow as cow or a chair as a chair with definite knowledge. It is seeing the object not merely as ‘that’ but also as ‘what’. It involves assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis. Determinate perception gives a differentiated, relational and conceptual and articulate knowledge. For example, we see a white moving object at a distance and when it comes near we see it as a white cow. The earlier stage of its perception is indeterminate and the latter one is determinate perception. Indeterminate perception presents the bare object without any characterization. It is psychological and not logical. It is confined to feeling and sensation devoid of conception. But it immediately passes into determinate perception which is logical, cognitive and judgmental. The Nyāya holds that the two perceptions are not two different kinds. Indeed, there is only one perception, namely, the determinate one. Indeterminate perception is only the earlier stage of the determinate perception. Thus the two perceptions can be separated only in thought and not in reality.

4. Inference (Anumāna)

The second kind of valid knowledge, according to the Nyāya, is inferential or relational (anumāna) and it is also called inference (anumāna). Inference is the cognition which presupposes some other knowledge. Inferential knowledge is indirect, mediate and arises through a ‘mark’ (hetu). This mark is called the middle term (linga) which is contained in the minor term (pakşadharmata) and invariably associated with the major term (sādhya). The invariable connection of the middle term with the major term is also called the invariable concomitance (vyāpti or avinābhāvaniyama) between them. It is the nerve of inferential knowledge. It is knowledge (‘mana’) which arises after ‘anu’ other knowledge (paramarsha). It arises through the knowledge of the presence of the major term in the minor term through the middle term which resides in the minor and is invariably associated with major term. The Nayayika illustrates it with the following example: if we see smoke in the hill we conclude or infer that there must be fire in the hill. Our inference here is based on our knowledge that smoke is invariably found with fire (Vyāpti). In this example, the hill is the minor term (pakşa), the fire is the major term (sādhya) and smoke is the middle term (hetu). Here we infer the presence of the fire in the hill from the presence of smoke in the hill as qualified by the knowledge that wherever there is smoke there is fire.

5. Comparison (Upamāna)

Comparison is the third kind of valid knowledge. It is cognition derived by means of analogy or comparison between the two objects. It has also been defined as the knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. It is produced by the knowledge of the similarity or resemblance, for example, recognizing a wild cow in the forest as ‘gavaya’ depending on its similarity to the cow. A person who has never seen a gavaya and does not know what it is subsequently comes across a gavaya in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow because he was told (sabda) by another person that a wild cow looks like a domestic cow. The person has heard the word ‘gavaya’ and has been told that it is like an ordinary cow and the person himself sees the animal denoted by the word ‘gavaya’ and recognizes it to be so. So comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by that name.

6. Verbal Testimony (Śabda)

The last and the fourth kind of valid knowledge, according to the Nyāya, is verbal testimony (Śabda). It is the cognition derived from words or speech. Verbal testimony is regarded as the most important source of knowledge. It is a reliable and authoritative source of knowledge when the speaker is trustworthy. The Nyāya says that verbal testimony is of two kinds: ordinary verbal testimony (lokavākya) and scriptural verbal testimony (śāstravākya). Ordinary verbal testimony comes from a reliable and trustworthy person who has direct or indirect knowledge of the object in question. Scriptural verbal testimony, on the other hand, comes from authoritative texts like the Vedas and other sacred scriptures. The trustworthiness of the speaker is vital to the validity of verbal testimony. Without such trustworthiness, verbal testimony would be unreliable.

7. The Theory of Causality

The Nyāya system also discusses the theory of causality, emphasizing the concept of the relation between cause and effect. According to the Nyāya, every effect has a cause, and there can be no effect without a cause. The causality is governed by the principle of invariable concomitance, meaning that the effect always follows the cause whenever the cause is present. In the system of Nyāya, the cause and effect are not independent of each other but are interrelated in a logical manner. There are three types of causes in Nyāya: the material cause (upādāna), the efficient cause (nimitta), and the final cause (prayojana). The material cause is the substance or matter from which the effect is produced. The efficient cause is the agent or force that brings about the effect. The final cause is the purpose or goal for which the effect is brought into existence.

8. Liberation (Mokşa)

In the Nyāya system, liberation (Mokşa) is the ultimate goal of human life. It is the state of freedom from suffering and the cessation of all mental distractions and attachments. Liberation is attained through right knowledge and the elimination of ignorance. The Nyāya system holds that ignorance is the root cause of suffering, and liberation is achieved by realizing the true nature of reality. This realization can only be attained through logical reasoning, critical analysis, and proper understanding of the self and the world. The means to liberation in Nyāya is the practice of right cognition, right action, and right conduct, guided by the principles of logic and reasoning.

9. Conclusion

To conclude, the Nyāya system is a highly analytical and logical school of thought that has significantly contributed to Indian philosophy. Its emphasis on epistemology, logic, and reasoning makes it an important system in the study of knowledge, reality, and liberation. By focusing on the methods of acquiring valid knowledge, the Nyāya system provides a clear framework for understanding the world and the path to ultimate freedom.

📖