British Ascendancy over Sindh: Key Events & Historical Timeline

Gradual Ascendancy over Sindh

A common belief in the late 18th century was that Napoleon was conspiring with Tipu Sultan to invade India.
In 1799 behind Lord Wellesley’s efforts to revive commercial relations with Sindh was the hidden aim to counteract the alliance of the French, Tipu Sultan and Shah Zaman, the Kabul monarch.
Negotiations were opened with Fath Ali Khan.
But under the influence of Tipu Sultan and the jealousy of the local traders, aided by the anti-British party at Hyderabad (Sindh), the amir in October 1800, ordered the British agent to quit Sindh within ten days.
The British agent (Crow) left Sindh and the Company quietly suffered the insult.

In June 1807, the alliance of Tilsit with Alexander I of Russia was joined by Napoleon Bonaparte.
The alliance had as one of its conditions a combined invasion of India by the land route.
Now the British wanted to create a barrier between Russia and British India.
To achieve this, Lord Minto sent three delegations under the leadership of various prominent persons to forge alliances.
Accordingly, Metcalfe was sent to Lahore, Elphinstone to Kabul and Malcolm to Teheran.
Sindh was visited by Nicholas Smith who met the Amirs to conclude a defensive arrangement.
After negotiations, the Amirs agreed to a treaty—their first-ever treaty with the English.
After professing eternal friendship, both sides agreed to exclude the French from Sindh and to exchange agents at each other’s court.
The treaty was renewed in 1820 with the addition of an article excluding the Americans and resolving some border disputes on the side of Kachch after the final defeat of the Maratha confederacy in 1818.

In 1832, William Bentinck sent Colonel Pottinger to Sindh to sign a treaty with the Amirs.
The provisions of the treaty were as follows:
Free passage through Sindh would be allowed to the English traders and travellers and the use of Indus for trading purposes; however, no warships would ply, nor any materials for war would be carried.
No English merchant would settle down in Sindh, and passports would be needed for travellers.
Tariff rates could be altered by the Amirs if found high and no military dues or tolls would be demanded.
The Amirs would work with the Raja of Jodhpur to put down the robbers of Kachch.
The old treaties were confirmed and the parties would not be jealous of each other.

Lord Auckland, who became the Governor-General in 1836, looked at Sindh from the perspective of saving India from a possible Russian invasion and wished to obtain a counteracting influence over the Afghans.
Ranjit Singh in Punjab was strong enough to resist coercion in this regard, but the Amirs were not.
Thus the English view was that they had to consolidate their position in Sindh as a necessary first step for their plans on Afghanistan.
They got an opportunity when Ranjit Singh captured a frontier town of Sindh, Rojhan, and Pottinger was sent to Hyderabad to sign a new treaty with the Amirs.
The treaty offered protection to the Amirs on the condition that the Company troops would be kept in the capital at the Amir’s expense or alternatively the English would be given suitable concessions in return.
The Amirs initially refused but later agreed reluctantly to sign the treaty in 1838 when the possibility of Ranjit Singh getting help from others was pointed out to them.
The treaty permitted the English to intervene in the disputes between the Amirs and the Sikhs as also to establish the presence of a British resident who could go anywhere he liked escorted by English troops.
Thus Sindh was turned into a British protectorate in 1838.

To address the Afghan problem (as the British imagined it) the Company resorted to further duplicity.
Firstly, they persuaded Ranjit Singh to sign a tripartite treaty in June 1838 agreeing to British mediation in his disputes with the Amirs, and then made Emperor Shah Shuja give up his sovereign rights on Sindh, provided the arrears of tribute were paid.
The exact amount of the tribute was to be determined by the English whose main objective was to obtain finances for the Afghan adventure and obtain so much of the Amirs’ territory as would secure a line of operation against Afghanistan through Sindh.

The Company intended to persuade or compel the Amirs to pay the money and also to consent to the abrogation of that article in the treaty of 1832 which prohibited the movement of English troops in Sindh by land or by river.
Under threat of superior force, the Amirs accepted a treaty in February 1839 by which a British subsidiary force had to be stationed at Shikarpur and Bukkar and the Amirs of Sindh were to pay Rs 3 lakh annually for the maintenance of the Company’s troops.
Henceforth, the Amirs were debarred from having any negotiations with foreign states without the knowledge of the Company.
Further, they were to provide store-room at Karachi for the Company’s military supplies, besides abolishing tolls on the Indus, as laid down in the treaty of 1832.
Meanwhile, Auckland had sent Pottinger to Herat to explore the possibility of its defence by a British force.
Pottinger reported that it was impossible to do so.
Nevertheless, Auckland decided to fight the Afghan war, and Sindh was turned into a transit camp.

The conquest of Sindh was considered necessary due to many reasons:
Presence of a large amount of wealth in Sindh (especially among the Amirs).
The state of Sindh was very fertile.
The British control over Sindh would have prevented the possibility of Persian expansion towards India with the help of the French.
The direct British control over Sindh would have prevented the Russian expansion towards India.
Gaining control over Sindh would have facilitated trade through the Indus River.
Thus the conquest of Sindh would have given the Britishers both the strategic and economic advantages.
Lord Ellenborough, the Governor-General of India, was responsible for the annexation of Sindh in 1843.

Gradual Ascendancy over Sindh